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TOURO LAW REVIEW
arrest warrant and in so doing finds narcotics in plain view, his
conduct will be evaluated, and not his identity. 7'
People v. Smith 72
(decided May 15, 1997)
Defendant, William Smith, also known as Frank Mills, was
convicted after a jury trial in the Supreme Court, New York
County, of grand larceny in the third and fourth degree, fourteen
counts of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree,
and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second
degree.1 73 Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of three
and one-half years to seven years on the third degree grand
larceny conviction, two years to four years on the fourth degree
grand larceny and the criminal possession of a forged instrument
in the second degree convictions, and one and one-half years to
three years on each of the offering a false instrument for filing in
the first degree convictions. 171
Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that his right
to be free from illegal search and seizure under the Federal'" and
171 Id. at 98, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
172 658 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 90 N.Y.2d 911, 686
N.E.2d 232, 663 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1997).
173 Id. at 260. The New York statute for grand larceny in the third and
fourth degree is embodied in New York Penal Law §§ 155.35 and 155.30
respectively. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.35, 155.30 (McKinney 1996). The
New York statute for offering a false instrument in the first degree is embodied
in the New York Penal Law § 175.35. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 175.35
(McKinney 1996). The New York statute for criminal possession of a forged
instrument in the second degree is embodied in the New York Penal Law
§ 170.25. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.25 (McKinney 1996).
174 Smith, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
175 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...
" Id.
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New York State Constitutions176 had been violated.1" Defendant
based his appeal on the lower court's refusal to suppress the
physical evidence recovered during a warrantless entry of his
home.178 The First Deparment with one dissenting opinion,
affirmed the convictions, holding that a defendant may consent to
a warrantless search of his home by conduct as well as words.1 79
At approximately 4:00 P.M., an individual, Sherrill, walked
into the New York City Midtown South police precinct and
advised Police Officer Gallo that a man named "Will" had
assaulted him, and that Will was "staying" in an apartment at 330
West 36" Street18 Officer Gallo accompanied Sherrill to the
involved apartment where they found the front door wide open.181
Sherrill identified the defendant, who could be seen through the
open door, as the assailant." Officer Gallo knocked on the door
and questioned the defendant who admitted to arguing with
Sherrill.1 3 Officer Gallo asked the defendant for identification
and defendant checked his pockets and stated he had no
identification.18" Defendant walked toward a dresser and Gallo
followed."' Officer Gallo testified that he wanted to see the
defendant's hands in case a weapon was retrieved.' I  The
defendant produced a wallet, pulling a card from it and then
176 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Article I, § 12 of the New York State
Constitution provides in pertinent part the following: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.., but upon reasonable cause...
" Id.177 Smith, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
178 Id. at 261.
179 Id. (citing People v. Satornino, 153 A.D.2d 595, 596, 544 N.Y.S.2d
224, 225 (2d Dep't 1989)).180 Smith, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
181 Id.
182Id.
183 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
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placing the card back in the wallet. 18'7 Defendant then produced a
welfare identification card which bore his photograph and the
name "Frank Mills." ' 8 Officer Gallo requested that the
defendant produce the other card which turned out to be another
welfare identification card bearing the defendant's photograph
and the name "William Smith."' 89 Officer Gallo then placed the
defendant under arrest. ,90
The United States Supreme Court evaluated a warrantless
search and seizure, in Payton v. New York, holding that "the
Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from making a
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in
order to make a routine felony arrest."' 9' The Court in Payton
asserted that a nonconsensual warrantless entry, by the police,
can be made, only, in exigent circumstances. 192
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 261.
190 Id.
191 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (reversing a murder conviction in which the police
without a warrant forced entry into the suspects home, in order to effect a
routine felony arrest with no exigent circumstances, and seized a .30 caliber
shell casing which was used as physical evidence in the defendant's trial).
192 Id. at 581. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY at 574 (6th ed. 1990). Exigent
circumstances are defined as:
situations that demand unusual or immediate action. Exigent
circumstances' in relation to warrantless arrest or search
refers generally to those situations where law enforcement
agents will be unable or unlikely to effectuate an arrest,
search or seizure for which probable cause exists unless they
act swiftly and without seeking prior judicial authorization.
Id. See also People v. Cloud, 79 N.Y.2d 786, 587 N.E.2d 270, 579
N.Y.S.2d 632 (1991) (holding that an exigency existed when police had
information that a suspect was in a hotel room with guns and hostages); People
v. Rosario, 179 A.D.2d 442, 579 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't 1992) (holding that
a warrantless entry was justified by a rape suspect asserting that he had another
girl inside).
[Vol 141194
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In the case at bar the court used the defendant's words and
conduct to determine that the officer's entry was consensual.' 93
The Appellate Division cited the holding in People v. Satorninol"
in which the court held that a defendant's mother consented to a
warrantless entry into the home when she advised police
detectives "that her son was in his bedroom and pointed to the
room."' In affirming the trial courts' ruling here, the court
found the defendant's actions of engaging in a discussion with
Officer Gallo, complying with the request for identification
without hesitation and not objecting to the officer's entry or
continued presence in the apartment as indicative that the
defendant "implicitly consented" to the officer's entry.' 9 The
First Department, in analyzing Officer Gallo's actions, found that
"[a] consensual entry is a compelling inference from these
facts."197 The Appellate Division in concluding the entry to be
consensual did not have to address whether or not Officer Gallo's
safety concerns constituted exigent circumstances that establish a
constitutionally permissible warrantless entry.'"
The dissent asserted that the conviction should be overturned as
the defendant did not consent to Officer Gallo's entry into the
house and that there was no exigency." Quoting Payton the
dissent asserted that "'the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm
193 Smith, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
194 153 A.D.2d 595, 596, 544 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (2d Dep't 1989).
195 Id.
196 Smith, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
197 Id. (citing People v. Davy, 654 N.Y.S.2d 309, 309 (Ist Dep't 1997)
(holding that "[t]he People met their burden that the defendant consented to a
police entry into his apartment when he voluntarily spoke with them and gave
them his gun"); People v. Gonzalez, 222 A.D.2d 453, 634 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d
Dep't 1995), lv. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 848, 667 N.E.2d 344, 644 N.Y.S.2d 694
(1996); People v. Washington, 209 A.D.2d 817, 619 N.Y.S.2d 360 (3d Dep't
1994), lv. denied, 85 N.Y.2d 944, 651 N.E.2d 931, 627 N.Y.S.2d 1006
(1995); People v. Schof, 136 A.D.2d 578, 523 N.Y.S.2d 179 (2d Dep't
1988); cf., People v. Richardson, 88 N.Y.2d 1026, 673 N.E.2d 1252, 651
N.Y.S.2d 25 (1996)).
198 Smith, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
99 Id. at 261-63 (Tom, J., dissenting).
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line at the entrance to the house"' and articulated the
constitutional principle that, absent exigency or consent, searches
and seizures in a home without a warrant are presumed
unreasonable and violative of the Constitution.200
Additionally, the dissent pointed out that "[a]t no time did the
officer request permission to enter, and at no time was permission
granted" and that the defendant's conduct did not imply consent,
"such as opening wider the already opened door, or gesturing, or
stepping back from the door suggestive of an invitation. "21 The
dissent distinguished the body of New York law, in which the
courts found consensual entry, 02 from the case under review in
that the defendant made "[n]o objective manifestations connoting
even an implicit consent .... ,,203
In analyzing the propriety of the officer's safety concerns as
existence of exigent circumstances the dissent explained that "the
police by themselves cannot by their own conduct create the
appearance of exigency."204 The dissent argued that "at the door
to the apartment, Gallo observed no indication of any weaponry;
and defendant made no erratic or threatening moves;" therefore,
no exigency existed.m5
200 Id. at 262 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
201 Id.
22 Id. at 263 (Tom, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Murphy, 55 N.Y.2d
819, 432 N.E.2d 140, 447 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1981); People v. Gonzalez, 222
A.D.2d 453, 634 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1995), 1v. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 848,
667 N.E.2d 344, 644 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1996); People v. Washington, 209
A.D.2d 817, 619 N.Y.S.2d 360 (3d Dep't 1994), lv. denied, 85 N.Y.2d 944,
651 N.E.2d 931, 627 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1995); People v. Satornino, 153
A.D.2d 595, 544 N.Y.S.2d 224 (2d Dep't 1989); People v. Schof, 136
A.D.2d 578, 523 N.Y.S.2d 179 (2d Dep't 1988); People v. Dubois, 140
A.D.2d 619, 528 N.Y.S.2d 660 (2d Dep't 1988); People v. Davis, 120
A.D.2d 606, 502 N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dep't 1986)).
203Id. (Tom, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 262 (Tom, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Levan, 62 N.Y.2d
139, 146, 464 N.E.2d 469, 471, 476 N.Y.S.2d 101, 104 (1984)).
205 Id. (Tom, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Cloud, 79 N.Y.2d 786, 587
N.E.2d 270, 579 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1991) (finding an exigency existed when a
suspect was thought to be in a hotel room with guns and hostages); People v.
Rosario, 179 A.D.2d 442, 579 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't 1992) (holding that an
1196 [Vol 14
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While the statutory language of the federal law and state law,
involving search and seizure, is very similar. the courts have held
that both laws recognize "the basic constitutional principle that,
absent exigency or consent, searches and seizures within a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and a violation
of the... Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. 0
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Hichez
(decided June 23, 1997)
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the
defendant's conviction of burglary in the second degree, grand
larceny in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property
in the third degree and reckless endangerment in the second
degree but modified the sentencing of all charges 303 The
defendant, Abraham Hichez, contends that his arrest was in
violation of Payton v. New York,2w and therefore any evidence
exigency existed when a rape suspect asserted that he had another girl in the
room)).
206 Smith, 658 N.Y.S. at 262 (Tom, J., dissenting) (citing Payton, 445 U.S.
573, 586 (1980)).
2 659 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d Dep't 1997).
2Id. at 489.
2- 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, defendants contended that the New
York statute allowing police officers to make a felony arrest inside a person's
home without a warrant and with force was in contradiction to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 574. The revised statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 140.15(4), 120.80 (McKinney 1971) provides in pertinent part:
In order to effect such an arrest, a police officer may enter
premises in which he reasonably believes such a person to be
present, under the same circumstances and in the same
manner as would be authorized, by the provisions of
subdivisions four and five of section 120.80, if he were
attempting to make such arrest pursuant to a warrant of
arrest.
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